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The Bill of Rights may be facing its Frederick Jackson Turner
moment, the day when its last frontier is being settled and cultivated.1
Previously neglected parts of the Bill of Rights—the Ninth
Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, even the Second Amendment2—
are no longer uncharted. And now, with this Symposium, the last
neglected amendment, the Third Amendment,3 already lightly
explored, is seeing the first small settlements spring up.
The questions raised elsewhere in this issue are worthy, and their
answers important, but my own contribution, such as it is, is inspired
by the famous words of Leon Lipson, as reported by Arthur Allen Leff:
“Anything you can do, I can do meta.”4 So while others address the
metes and bounds of the Third Amendment itself, I intend to address
a different question: Does the Third Amendment cast penumbras?
And, if so, what terrain do they shadow?5 And do those shadows shed

* Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of
Tennessee
1. FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, The Significance of the Frontier in American
History, in REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 199 (Readex
Microprint 1966) (1893) (noting the closing of the American frontier via settlement at
the end of the Nineteenth Century and speculating on its implications).
2. See Symposium, New Frontiers in the Second Amendment, 81 TENN. L. REV.
407 (2014).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered
in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner
to be prescribed by law.”).
4. Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J.
1229, 1230 n.2 (1979) (“What follows is a pure instantiation of his category.” Here, too).
5. See Henry T. Greely, A Footnote to “Penumbra” in Griswold v. Connecticut, 6
CONST. COMMENT. 251, 252 (1989). Greely points out that “penumbra” originated with
the astronomer Johannes Kepler, who wrote that during an eclipse the central shadow,
or “umbra,” is dark and sharply defined, while it is surrounded by a lighter and less
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any light (mixed metaphor though that might be) on other
constitutional questions?
I. DOES THE THIRD AMENDMENT CAST PENUMBRAS?
The question of whether the Third Amendment casts penumbras
is an easy one: Of course it does. And we know that because the
Supreme Court has told us so.6
When talking about constitutional rights’' penumbras, speakers
are sometimes describing auxiliary protections for the core right—for
example, those provided in the First Amendment realm by “chilling
effect” considerations, overbreadth, or prior restraint doctrine. These
auxiliary protections ensure that the core right is genuinely protected
by creating a buffer zone that prevents officious government actors
from stripping the right of real meaning through regulations that
indirectly—but perhaps fatally—burden its exercise.7
What would such auxiliary protections look like in the context of
the Third Amendment? Such a penumbral approach to the
interpretation of the Third Amendment might encourage a broader
reading of the term “troops” to include any paramilitary government
agency—from police or SWAT teams to DHS or Secret Service
agents—and a reading of the purposes of the Third Amendment that
would include such things as government-installed malware on home
computers that provides for round-the-clock snooping from inside a
citizen’s dwelling, or government-mandated “smart” utility meters
that serve similar functions.
But more often when speakers discuss penumbras, they are
discussing the kind of project that the Supreme Court undertook in
Griswold v. Connecticut—to look at various constitutional provisions,
and how they interact and overlap, and to extract, from that
interaction and overlapping, some new doctrines implied by that
interaction.8 This is a species of reasoning by structure and
relationship, to use Charles Black’s term.9 That is what the Supreme
Court did in Griswold v. Connecticut, and that is what I intend to
discuss here.

distinct partial shadow, or “penumbra”—from the Latin “paene” (almost) and “umbra”
(shadow). Id.
6. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
7. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Second Amendment Penumbras: Some Preliminary
Observations, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 248 (2012) (describing different meanings of
“penumbra” with regard to constitutional rights).
8. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–86; Reynolds, supra note 7, at 255.
9. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (La. State Univ. Press ed.1969).
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It is perhaps worth noting that the term “penumbra,” though
famously used in the Griswold opinion, has a much longer history in
legal usage. In particular, Karl Llewellyn used the term in his The
Constitution as an Institution, writing:
The discussion above with reference to the nature of an
institution and the inevitable character of its gradual shading
off into surrounding complexes of ways (be they
complementary, competing, or merely cross-currents fulfilling
other needs) will have made clear my belief that, whatever one
takes as being this working Constitution, he will find the edges
of his chosen material not sharp, but penumbra-like. And the
penumbra will of necessity be in constant flux. New patterns
of action develop, win acceptance (sometimes suddenly), grow
increasingly standardized among an increasing number of the
relevant persons, become more and more definitely and
consciously “the thing to do,” proceed to gain value as honored
in tradition—i.e., become things to be accepted in and of
themselves without question of their utility—until they take
on finally, to more and more of the participants, the flavor of
the “Basic.”10
And in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Third Amendment’s
penumbra played an important role in determining a constitutional
right to contraceptive use. In that case, the Supreme Court, after
discussing numerous provisions of the Bill of Rights whose protection
sweeps beyond their plain language,11 commented:
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill
of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various
guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as

10. K. N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26–
27 (1934) (footnotes omitted); see also Burr Henly, “Penumbra”: The Roots of a Legal
Metaphor, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81, 83 (1987). As Henly points out, the term
“penumbra” had been used by such well known authorities as Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Benjamin Cardozo, Felix Frankfurter, and Learned Hand, as well as Justice Douglas
himself and Professor H.L.A. Hart, before the Griswold opinion came down. See id. at
83–92. Nor did the use of penumbral reasoning cease with Griswold. See, e.g., Glenn
Harlan Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning On the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1333 passim
(1992) (describing use of penumbral reasoning in numerous contexts, often in support
of holdings generally regarded as “right wing”); see also Brannon P. Denning & Glenn
Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1090, 1097–117
(1997) (following up on the earlier piece).
11. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–83.
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we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against
the quartering of soldiers “in any house” in time of peace
without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy.
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the “right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The
Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not
force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: “The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.”
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v.
United States as protection against all governmental invasions
“of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. . . .”
.

.

.

The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within
the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in
forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating
their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means
having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship.
Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so
often applied by this Court, that a “governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.” Would we allow the police to search the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the
use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions
of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—
older than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony
in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.12
But if penumbral reasoning means using the enumerated rights
as guidepoints in determining the shape of unenumerated rights, as

12. Id. at 484–86 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (first emphasis added);
see U.S. CONST. amend. I, III, IV, V, & IX.
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the Court did in Griswold,13 how does the Supreme Court’s recognition
of the Third Amendment affect things today? What role did the Third
Amendment’s penumbras play in Griswold, and what role might they
play in future cases? I will first take a closer look at Griswold, then
look at the landmark Third Amendment case of Engblom v. Carey,14
and then suggest some future roles for the Third Amendment in the
Twenty-First Century.
II. THE THIRD AMENDMENT IN GRISWOLD
Griswold, of course, was a case in which a Connecticut state law—
seldom enforced, but still on the books—made it illegal for any person
to use any drug or device for the purpose of preventing conception.15
After encountering some difficulty with earlier efforts,16 the plaintiffs,
the executive director of Planned Parenthood, and a physician
working for its clinic, managed to get their challenge before the
court.17
As noted in the passage quoted above, the Court, through Justice
Douglas, adopted a penumbral approach in arriving at its conclusion
that the Connecticut statute was one of those laws which “sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.”18 But what work, exactly, was the Third Amendment doing
here? The Court’s horror at searching the “sacred precincts” of the
marital bedroom for “telltale signs” of the use of contraceptives19
would appear to be the sort of thing generally protected by the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments.20 Indeed, the Court said, quoting Boyd v.
United States,21 that:
The principles laid down in this opinion [by Lord Camden in
Entick v. Carrington] affect the very essence of constitutional
liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form
of the case then before the court, with its adventitious
circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the

13. For an extensive discussion of the methodology in Griswold and a response
to a leading critic of the decision, see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Sex, Lies and
Jurisprudence: Robert Bork, Griswold, and the Philosophy of Original Understanding,
24 GA. L. REV. 1045 passim (1990).
14. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982).
15. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
16. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
17. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480–81.
18. Id. at 485.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 484.
21. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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government and its employes of the sanctity of a man’s home
and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and
the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of
the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property,
where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of
some public offence—it is the invasion of this sacred right
which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden’s
judgment. Breaking into a house and opening boxes and
drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible
and compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his
private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime
or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that
judgment. In this regard, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
run almost into each other.22
So what work, then, is being done by the Third Amendment and
its penumbras? The Third Amendment does not forbid the searching
of homes or the subpoenaing of diaries—that’s the work of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments—but rather the insertion of state agents into
the fabric of an individual’s private life. The real problem with having
troops quartered in one’s home, after all, is not the necessity of
providing bed and board at one’s own expense, irksome as that might
be. Rather, it is the disruption of one’s domestic life, the occupation of
one’s hearth, the inability to engage in domestic confidences, displays
of affection, or even spats without the interfering presence of a third
party observer. This is why having troops quartered in one’s home is
more of an intrusion than, say, simply being taxed to support the
quartering of troops elsewhere.
In Griswold, then, the penumbra of the Third Amendment was
triggered by the fact that Connecticut’s law, which interposed itself
between a married couple and their physicians, similarly invaded the
couple’s domestic life. And by co-opting the state-licensed medical
providers, the Connecticut law treaded on the penumbra, if not the
core, of the Third Amendment. Where the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments limit government searches and compelled testimony,
the Third Amendment prohibits the government from inserting itself
into a domestic situation and observing (or influencing) events as they
happen.

22. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 n.* (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (alteration in
original) (citation omitted).
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III. BEYOND GRISWOLD
This is a comparatively narrow penumbral reading of the Third
Amendment, though one with potentially great application in the
Twenty-First Century, where a combination of technological
advancement and government nannyism make such insertion
considerably more likely. But the Second Circuit opinion in Engblom
v. Carey23 broadens the penumbra significantly. Engblom involved
dormitory-like residences occupied by New York correctional
officers.24 When those officers went on strike, the state evicted them
and housed National Guard troops in their place.25
When the correctional officers sued, claiming, inter alia, a
violation of their rights under the Third Amendment,26 the Second
Circuit held: (1) that National Guardsmen were “soldiers” for
purposes of the Third Amendment; (2) that the Third Amendment was
applicable against the states via incorporation under the Fourteenth
Amendment, something assumed but not made explicit by Griswold;27
and (3) most importantly, that the Third Amendment “was designed
to assure a fundamental right of privacy.”28 What’s more, that right
was to be enjoyed by anyone legitimately occupying a dwelling,
whether in fee simple, by leasehold, etc.29
So what does it mean that the Third Amendment assures “a
fundamental right of privacy” in a dwelling-place? If that right is not
to be mere surplusage—and, as we know, constitutional rights are
never presumed to be mere surplusage30—then it must do something
that isn’t already done by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The
Fourth Amendment limits searches to circumstances where there is
probable cause.31 But does the Third Amendment impose additional
limitations, even in the presence of probable cause?
I think that it does. By carving out an area of domestic privacy
that is immune from intermeddling state officials, the Third
Amendment’s penumbra reaches beyond the prohibitions and
limitations on government criminal investigations contained in the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Instead, the “sacred precincts” of the
domestic sphere possess their own, independent immunities, even

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 958–59.
Id.
Id. at 958.
Griswold, 318 U.S. at 484.
Engblom, 677 F.2d at 961–62.
Id. at 962.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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where non-criminal aspects of government operation are concerned,
as well as when criminal procedure doctrines—e.g., probable cause—
might otherwise permit government intrusion. After all, the notion of
searching marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraception was abhorrent in itself, without reference to whether
such use was a crime, and whether the government might have
probable cause to search.
Third Amendment penumbras might also affect other, nonphysical intrusions into the home: “Affirmative consent” laws, sodomy
laws, and other state regulations into the sexual behavior of
consenting adults—perhaps even those who are unmarried—would
seem quite close to the core Griswold holding, certainly affecting the
“sacred precincts” of conjugal, if not actually marital, bedrooms. And
going beyond sex, one might imagine that intrusive governmental
regulations of childrearing, education, diet, and other domestic
elements might fall within the Third Amendment’s penumbral
protections. All seem as closely related to the maintenance of
unmolested domestic bliss as, say, the right to have a diaphragm or
condoms in the nightstand.
IV. THE THIRD AMENDMENT AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS
In Griswold, of course, the Third Amendment did not do its work
alone. Instead, it operated in tandem with other constitutional
protections, including the Ninth Amendment’s provision that the
enumeration of certain constitutional rights should not be construed
to deny or disparage other rights retained by the people, though not
specifically enumerated.32 One might argue—and, in fact, I have
argued elsewhere, at tedious length33—that the Ninth Amendment
may be read, in part, as a command to use penumbral reasoning as a
means of determining what unenumerated rights are protected.
The broadened and strengthened role for the Third Amendment
as a general protector of household privacy found in Engblom may
thus serve to increase the impact of the Third Amendment beyond
whatever effect (apparently significant) that it had in Griswold. In
determining, for example, whether municipal ordinances involving
guns in the home violate the Constitution, courts should look both at
the Second Amendment’s right to arms34 and at the general protection
of domestic privacy provided by the Third Amendment. Likewise, in

32.
33.
34.

U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 1083–84.
U.S. CONST. amend. II.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2616034

2015]

THIRD AMENDMENT PENUMBRAS

9

assessing the legitimacy of, say, no-knock SWAT raids on residences,
courts should look not only at the protections provided by the Fourth
Amendment35 but also, again, at the Third Amendment’s protection of
a fundamental right of privacy in one’s dwelling. The penumbras of
the Third Amendment, in conjunction with those other provisions,
may impel stricter limits on official intrusions than would be provided
by the Second or Fourth Amendments alone. These implications of the
Third Amendment, read in light of the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Griswold, all seem quite straightforward to me, but I must confess
that I am not enormously optimistic that the courts will see things
this way. There are reasons for that, none of them especially
compelling, but nonetheless likely to sway many courts.
The first and most important is that many critics of Griswold have
gone out of their way to give penumbral reasoning a bad name. Of
course, the term “bad name” is particularly descriptive here: Courts
go on using penumbral reasoning—because it is almost
indispensable—they just take care to avoid using the word
“penumbra,” preferring instead terms like “the tacit postulates of
federalism.”36 Thus, despite the Griswold critics, penumbral
reasoning has continued apace, camouflaged, perhaps, by carefully
chosen language, but no less real for all that.
The second reason, though, is that in our topsy-turvy judicial
system today, finding new rights on the part of citizens is out of favor.
Interpreting the Commerce Clause or the Taxing Power to allow the
government to do things that the Framers never contemplated has
somehow come to be seen as straight-up judicial reasoning, while
finding new rights—even though the Bill of Rights specifically states
that such unenumerated rights exist37—has somehow come to be seen
by many as fuzzy-headed and unprincipled. This is a matter of judicial
fashion and like all fashions is subject to change. But while it lasts, I
fear that the Third Amendment’s penumbras will do less work than,
properly speaking, they should.
CONCLUSION
The Second Amendment has passed from subject of academic
discussion into the realm of ordinary constitutional law. The Third
Amendment, as yet, has not. Though there is solid judicial precedent
giving Third Amendment protections force, there is not, as of yet, a
body of Third Amendment law comparable in extent to that enjoyed

35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36. See Denning & Reynolds, supra note 10, at 1098–1101, 1104–05 (describing
modern uses of penumbral reasoning); Reynolds, supra note 10.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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by other Bill of Rights provisions, even the comparatively newly
recognized Second Amendment.
But constitutional law abhors a vacuum, and it is thus inevitable
that the Third Amendment should draw more attention. While it may
be some time before the Third Amendment’s penumbras get as much
attention as this brief Essay suggests they deserve, that day is, I
submit, more or less inevitable. I am delighted to have been part of
this Symposium, which is doing so much to advance the day when the
Third Amendment enjoys the recognition that it deserves.
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